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Abstract 
 
For some people, simple sensory stimuli (e.g. noises, patterns) may reliably evoke intense 
and aversive reactions.  This is common in certain clinical groups (e.g. autism) and varies 
greatly in the neurotypical population.  This paper critically evaluates the concept of 
individual differences in sensory sensitivity, explores its possible underlying neurobiological 
basis, and presents a roadmap for future research in this area.  A distinction is made between 
subjective sensory sensitivity (self-reported symptoms); neural sensory sensitivity (the degree 
of neural activity induced by sensory stimuli); and behavioural sensory sensitivity (detection 
and discrimination of sensory stimuli).  Whereas increased subjective and neural sensory 
sensitivity are assumed to increase together, the status of behavioural sensory sensitivity 
depends on the extent to which the increased neural activity is linked to signal or noise.  A 
signal detection framework is presented that offers a unifying framework for exploring 
sensory sensitivity across different conditions.  The framework is discussed, in more concrete 
terms, by linking it to four existing theoretical accounts of atypical sensory sensitivity (not 
necessarily mutually exclusive): increased excitation-to-inhibition ratio; predictive coding; 
increased neural noise; and atypical brain connectivity. 
 
Keywords: 
Sensory sensitivity; autism; synaesthesia/synaesthesia; migraine; predictive coding; 
connectivity; neural noise. 
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The same simple sensory stimulus may reliably evoke different responses in different 
individuals.  For some people, certain sounds (e.g. of chewing) may be reported as extremely 
unpleasant or the feel of a clothes label may cause endless irritation.  For others, repetitive 
high contrast visual patterns (e.g. ‘op art’) can appear to shimmer or induce feelings of 
nausea.  These kinds of atypical sensory sensitivities have been linked to a wide variety of 
conditions including migraine (Schwedt, 2013), autism spectrum disorder (Tavassoli, 
Hoekstra, & Baron-Cohen, 2014), ADHD (Bijlenga, Tjon-Ka-Jie, Schuijers, & Kooij, 2017), 
Tourette syndrome (Belluscio, Jin, Watters, Lee, & Hallett, 2011), and synaesthesia (Ward et 
al., 2017).  One lady with autism describes her experiences thus: “the sensory overload 
caused by bright lights, fluorescent lights, colours, and patterns makes the body react as if 
being attacked or bombarded, resulting in such physical symptoms as headaches, anxiety, 
panic attacks or aggression” (p. 43 Williams, 1994).  These differences in subjective sensory 
sensitivity also vary greatly within the neurotypical population, to the extent that they can 
overlap in severity with individuals with a clinical diagnosis (A. E. Robertson & Simmons, 
2013).   
The aim of this paper is to critically evaluate the concept of individual differences in 
sensory sensitivity, explore its possible underlying neurobiological basis, and present a 
roadmap for future research in this area.  The focus of the paper is at the symptom level, 
rather than seeking to offer more general explanations of any one particular condition (e.g. 
autism).  It integrates evidence across multiple conditions and from neurotypical variation, as 
well as from multiple senses.  The aim is not to argue that a single explanation will apply to 
all conditions linked to atypical sensory sensitivity (although it might).  Rather, the aim is to 
facilitate dialogue between researchers working in different areas, and to develop a common 
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conceptual framework and common methodologies that enable the similarities and 
differences across conditions to be better understood. 
The starting point is the symptomatology itself, which can be regarded as hyper-
sensitivity (i.e. over-responsiveness to sensory stimuli) and/or hypo-sensitivity (i.e. under-
responsiveness) and typically manifests itself across different senses. For example, the DSM-
V diagnostic criteria for autism states the following: “Hyper- or hypo-reactivity to sensory 
input or unusual interests in sensory aspects of the environment (e.g., apparent indifference to 
pain/temperature, adverse response to specific sounds or textures, excessive smelling or 
touching of objects, visual fascination with lights or movement).”  Various questionnaires 
have been developed to quantify and understand the range of symptoms (Crane, Goddard, & 
Pring, 2009; Robertson & Simmons, 2013; Tavassoli et al., 2014) and some are translated 
into other languages (Sapey-Triomphe, Moulin, Sonie, & Schmitz, 2018; Takayama et al., 
2014).  These are suitable for high functioning adults, and comparable measures exist for 
children (Dunn, 1999).   For instance the Glasgow Sensory Questionnaire (GSQ) asks 
questions relating to hyper- and hypo-sensitivity from different sensory modalities 
(Robertson & Simmons, 2013).  When administered to a neurotypical population, it was 
found that all questions tended to load on to a single, common factor.  That is, the same 
people tend to report both hyper- and hypo-sensitivities and they do so across multiple 
senses.  The same pattern, albeit with considerably higher scores, has been found when these 
measures have been given to special groups including autism and synaesthesia (e.g. Ward et 
al., 2017).  The co-occurrence of hyper- and hypo-sensitivities is a puzzle.  This may be 
because these concepts, particularly hypo-sensitivities, are ill-defined.  For instance, 
repetitive or unusual sensory behaviours are sometimes assumed to reflect hypo-sensitivity 
but could be explained in other ways (e.g. obsessive motor acts, rather than low sensory 
reception).  Example items including “Do you eat the same foods most of the time?” and “Do 
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you flick your fingers in front of your eyes?”.  Most models focus primarily on atypical 
hyper-sensitivity and, arguably, this is the symptom that most impacts life quality.  This 
paper will also consider how the various models could account for hypo-sensitivity in 
addition to hyper-sensitivity. 
The fact that multiple sensory modalities are reported to be affected on questionnaire 
measures of atypical sensory sensitivity is suggestive of a central origin (i.e. brain-level) 
rather than peripheral origin (e.g. at the level of receptors or ascending nerve fibers).  
Whether multiple senses are always affected is less clear.  A likely exception is 
photosensitive epilepsy which is related specifically to vision (Porciatti, Bonanni, Fiorentini, 
& Guerrini, 2000).  Other possible exceptions are the newly reported conditions of 
misophonia (extreme aversion to certain sounds, see Brout et al., 2018) and ‘visual snow’ 
(tiny dots in visual field often accompanied by light aversion, Schankin, Maniyar, Digre, & 
Goadsby, 2014).  However, there is some evidence that non-auditory modalities are hyper-
sensitive in misophonia (Wu, Lewin, Murphy, & Storch, 2014) and tinnitus is prevalent in 
people with visual snow (Schankin, et al., 2014).  Migraine, although frequently studied in 
terms of visually induced symptoms, has also been noted to be linked to hyper-sensitivity 
across multiple sensory modalities (Schwedt, 2013).  Sensory sensitivity questionnaires 
developed for other conditions, such as autism, have yet to be run on this group.  Modality-
specific hyper-sensitivities can, of course, emerge as a result of compensatory neural 
plasticity in response to acquired sensory loss in one modality.  Examples of this include 
increased subjective sensitivity to sounds as a result of partial hearing loss and tinnitus 
(termed hyperacusis, Norena, 2011), and enhanced subjective sensitivity to touch following 
tissue damage (termed allodynia, Woolf, 2011).  The present review focusses on stable non-
acquired individual differences that likely reflect neurodevelopmental differences. 
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 In the following section, I outline a framework for linking the clinically relevant 
subjective symptoms to objective neurophysiological and behavioural findings.  In the 
remaining sections, I discuss several specific theoretical models for explaining atypical 
sensory sensitivity (primarily hyper-sensitivity): namely, increased excitation-to-inhibition; 
enhanced sensory processing (including predictive coding models); increased neural noise; 
and atypical brain connectivity. 
 
Individual Differences in Sensory Sensitivity and a Simple Framework in Terms of 
Neural Signal and Noise 
 
 Firstly, it is important to make a distinction between individual differences in 
subjective sensory sensitivity, behavioural sensory sensitivity, and neural sensory sensitivity.  
Different parts of the literature tend to focus on only one of these, leading to a confused and 
inconsistent picture.  By definition, clinical symptoms focus on subjective sensory sensitivity: 
they are first person reports of aversion to bright lights, feelings of ‘sensory overload’, etc.  
Behavioural sensory sensitivity, on the other hand, refers to the ability to discriminate or 
detect sensory stimuli.  Finally, individual differences in neural sensory sensitivity refer to 
differences in the magnitude of a neurophysiological response (e.g. BOLD in fMRI, EEG, or 
spiking rate) to a given sensory stimulus across individuals.  These have tended to be the 
focus for animal models of sensory sensitivity. 
 How are these three different concepts related to each other?  Although there are a 
wide variety of mechanisms that could contribute towards individual differences in sensory 
sensitivity, I will suggest that they map on to a relatively small number of basic possibilities 
that arise from considering perceptual processing in terms of neural signal and neural noise.  
With regards to the relationship between subjective sensory sensitivity and neural sensory 
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sensitivity, one pervasive assumption in the literature (reviewed below) is that 
groups/individuals who are subjectively hyper-sensitive have a greater neural response to 
those sensory stimuli.  Importantly, this would occur irrespective of whether the neural 
response was signal (i.e. stimulus-relevant) or noise (i.e. stimulus-irrelevant) or both.  There 
is surprisingly little direct evidence for this assumption.  Groups known to report subjectively 
high sensory sensitivity, such as migraine (Coutts, Cooper, Elwell, & Wilkins, 2012) and 
autism (Schwarzkopf, Anderson, de Haas, White, & Rees, 2014), have a greater BOLD 
response than neurotypical people to the same sensory stimuli.  These studies did not measure 
subjective sensory sensitivity directly (e.g. using a questionnaire) but other fMRI studies that 
have done so have shown correlations between self-report and stimulus-induced activity in 
sensory cortices (e.g. Green et al., 2015; Green et al., 2013).  However, little is known about 
the specific contribution of different brain regions (e.g. striate or extrastriate) or the kind of 
information (e.g. colour, motion, luminance) that is coded by the neural populations that track 
individual differences in subjective sensory sensitivity.  Moreover, it is possible, given that 
much neural processing is unconscious, for neural activity in certain regions to go up or down 
but without these changes contributing to subjective intensity or aversion to sensory stimuli 
(for discussion of how levels of neural activity don’t necessarily track visual awareness see 
Leopold, 2012).  The same concerns can be applied to all current animal models of individual 
differences in sensory sensitivity, which sidestep subjective sensory sensitivity altogether.  
However, the assumption that increased neural activity (in at least some populations of 
neurons) is linked to increased subjective sensory sensitivity remains the working hypothesis 
of all major current theories.  A null hypothesis, although not typically stated in such terms, is 
that individual differences in subjective sensory sensitivity are not related to either neural or 
behavioural sensory sensitivity but instead solely reflect post-sensory processing (e.g. 
idiosyncratic affective responses). 
8 
 
 The situation with regards to behavioural sensory sensitivity varies from theory to 
theory and, here, it does matter crucially whether the increased neural response primarily 
reflects increased signal (in which case increased behavioural sensitivity goes with increased 
neural sensory sensitivity and increased subjective sensory sensitivity) or reflects increased 
noise (in which case decreased behavioural sensitivity tends to go with increased neural and 
increased subjective sensory sensitivity).   
These basic ideas can be formalised in simple equations (from O'Hare & Hibbard, 
2016; Zhaoping, 2006) … 
O = K(S) + Na 
O refers to the output, i.e. the population response of neurons.  In the terminology 
introduced earlier, it is effectively a measure of neural sensory sensitivity (and a likely 
correlate of subjective sensory sensitivity). 
S refers to the signal-based neural response, and K() refers to the encoding function of 
the signal (i.e. what is done with it).  For instance, K() may amplify the signal (e.g. a 
mechanism referred to as gain control, e.g. Schwartz & Simoncelli, 2001), or determine 
whether the sensory signal is fed-forward to other neurons or not.  To pre-empt a later 
discussion, according to the predictive coding framework a sensory signal that is unexpected 
engenders more neural activity (i.e. K(S) is large) than one that is predicted (i.e. K(S) is 
small).  Individuals who have problems in predicting their sensory world would tend to have 
a larger K(S) and, hence, a larger output response (O) than in individuals who are good at 
predicting their sensory world. 
Na refers to the level of background noise (spontaneous neural activity).  A system 
that has higher noise levels would generate a higher output response (O).  Although noise 
would tend to reduce behavioural sensory sensitivity there are certain scenarios in which it 
can enhance it; for instance, if the sensory signal is just below detection/discrimination 
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threshold then noise can raise it above the threshold.  This phenomenon is termed stochastic 
resonance (McDonnell & Abbott, 2009) and has been proposed as a candidate mechanism for 
atypical sensory sensitivity in autism (Simmons et al., 2009), as discussed in more detail 
later. 
There is another potential source of noise that has been termed multiplicative noise 
(e.g. O'Hare & Hibbard, 2016) and can be represented by the addition of Nm to the equation 
below: 
O = K(S).(1+Nm) + Na 
Nm refers to noise that is only present when a signal is present (and proportional in size to the 
signal).  It could be conceptualised as aberrant propagation of activity from neurons carrying 
the signal to other neurons that connect to it but are not optimally tuned to that signal.  These 
could be neighbouring neurons within sensory cortex, for instance due to individual 
difference in excitation-to-inhibition characteristics (e.g. Rubenstein and Merzenich, 2003).  
It could also lead to propagation of neural activity to non-sensory regions (e.g. amygdala) that 
reflects, for instance, individual differences in functional/structural connectivity to and from 
sensory regions.  The resulting profile is that sensory processing appears more diffusely 
distributed.  Increases in Nm due to individual differences would increase neural sensory 
sensitivity (and, by implication, subjective sensory sensitivity) but would not increase 
behavioural sensory sensitivity.  In such cases, it is not clear whether one can isolate the 
signal component from the noise component (e.g. O'Hare & Hibbard, 2016) but the net effect 
is a sensory-evoked neural response that is larger and more variable (for methods of 
measuring the latter see Vilidaite & Baker, 2017).   
One of guiding design principles of neural computation is to maximise efficiency in 
order to reduce the metabolic costs of processing information that is redundant, irrelevant, or 
predictable (e.g. Atick, 1992).  For instance, in natural visual scenes there is a tendency for 
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any point in space to have similar properties to its neighbours (e.g. colour, luminance), except 
at edges, and for these properties to extend over time, except when the object moves.  Thus a 
pixel-like representation is metabolically/computationally inefficient because it is typically 
the case that one part of a spatial and temporal signal can be predicted by others.  A sparser 
system that represents only surfaces, edges, and other changes would be more efficient.  
Within this computational framework, the basic problem being solved is that of maximising 
behavioural sensory sensitivity whilst minimizing neural sensory sensitivity (because a high 
amount of neural responsiveness is metabolically costly).  However, different 
individuals/groups may adopt somewhat different solutions to this problem owing to intrinsic 
differences in their brain function and/or structure (e.g. connectivity, plasticity, 
neurotransmitters), with individual differences in subjective sensory sensitivity emerging as a 
consequence of this balancing act.  These are considered in more detail below. 
To summarise, although there is no shortage of different mechanisms that could affect 
the different terms in this equation, this signal processing approach (extended from research 
on migraine) offers a unifying framework for thinking about individual differences in sensory 
sensitivity across these mechanisms and across groups.  In the sections below, specific 
models and evidence are summarised in relation to this framework.  An overview summary is 
given in Table 1 of specific models and how they relate to this framework.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Theory 
(examples/s) 
Neural Mechanism Neural 
sensory 
sensitivity 
Subjective 
hyper-
sensitivity 
Behavioural 
sensory 
sensitivity 
Possible explanations of 
increased hypo-sensitivity 
Link to 
signal 
detection 
Increased Sensory 
Sensitivity due to 
an Increased 
Excitation-to-
Inhibition Ratio 
 (e.g. Rubenstein 
and Merzenich, 
2003) 
More glutamate/less GABA 
leading to propagation of 
neural activity and less sparse 
neural representations 
Increased Increased Decreased Behaviourally hypo-
sensitive despite sensory 
stimuli being subjectively 
intense 
Nm 
 Sensory Sensitivity 
due to Different 
Balance between 
Priors and Sensory 
Unpredicted sensory stimuli 
engender more neural activity  
Increased Increased Increased 
(mainly) 
Failure to adapt to repeated 
stimuli may render some 
stimuli hypo-sensitive 
K(S) 
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Inputs 
 (e.g. van der Cruys 
et al., 2014) 
Increased Sensory 
Sensitivity due to 
Differences in 
Endogenous Noise 
 (e.g. Simmons et 
al., 2009) 
Increased spontaneous neural 
activity (i.e. in both presence 
and absence of a sensory 
stimulus) 
Increased Increased Decreased 
(mainly) 
Fluctuations in noise can 
both enhance (hyper-) and 
reduce (hypo-) sensitivity 
Na 
Increased Sensory 
Sensitivity due to 
Altered Network 
Connectivity (e.g. 
Markram & 
Markram, 2010) 
Increased propagation of 
neural activity 
Increased Increased Uncertain 
(depends on 
the type of 
connections) 
Uncertain Nm? 
 
13 
 
 
14 
 
 
 
Increased Sensory Sensitivity due to an Increased Excitation-to-Inhibition Ratio 
 
 Rubenstein and Merzenich (2003) put forward a model of autism based on the notion 
of an imbalance between excitation and inhibition, such that autism is assumed to reflect 
either increased excitation and/or reduced inhibition.  This may reflect differences in 
receptors or neural circuits that involve the neurotransmitters glutamate (the main excitatory 
neurotransmitter in the brain) or GABA (gamma-aminobutyric acid, the main inhibitory 
neurotransmitter in the brain).  Evidence in general support of this account comes from: the 
high prevalence of epilepsy and seizures in people with autism (Tuchman & Rapin, 2002), 
genetic variations within the GABA system producing autistic symptoms (e.g. see Coghlan et 
al., 2012), and animal models of autism that manipulate GABA or glutamate (e.g. Han et al., 
2012).  Although developed with autism in mind, the general assumptions of the model are 
relevant for thinking about individual differences in sensory sensitivity more generally. 
With regards to linking this brain-based mechanism to cognitive functions, 
Rubenstein and Merzenich (2003) argued that an increased ratio of excitation to inhibition 
disrupts functional differentiation during development.  Specifically, more positive coupling 
of neuronal responses leads to less specific tuning to properties in the environment, i.e. a less 
sparse neural representation.  The latter essentially corresponds to increased multiplicative 
noise (Nm) in the equation above.  In terms of neural architecture, neocortical function is 
organised into mini-columns which consist of both excitatory and inhibitory neurons that 
respond within the mini-column to related stimuli, but with GABA-mediated lateral 
inhibition between mini-columns that serve to ‘sharpen’ the neural response (e.g. Isaacson & 
Scanziani, 2011).  Rubenstein and Merzenich (2003) argue that increasing this ratio (i.e. more 
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glutamate and/or less GABA) would result in a sensory stimulus eliciting a stronger, but 
more noisy/variable, neural response (hyper-sensitive at the neural level) because it is less 
sharp and less sparse.  This increased ratio gives rise to cognitive dysfunction, including 
sensory hyper-sensitivity (at neural level and presumably in terms of subjective sensory 
sensitivity).  However, neural responses that are more noisy would lead to less behavioural 
sensory sensitivity (i.e. worse discrimination of sensory signals).  This also offers one 
example how hyper-sensitivity (increased subjective intensity) and hypo-sensitivity (worse 
sensory detection/discrimination) can co-occur without contradiction.   Figure 1 shows an 
example of different patterns of neural responsiveness corresponding to sparse and diffuse 
sensory signals (and also the possibility, discussed later, of increased background noise). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Figure 1: Neural responsiveness to different sensory stimuli (A and B) and to the absence of 
a stimulus in three different scenarios.  The squares on a grid could represent individual 
neurons, cortical mini-columns, or voxels in fMRI (the basic principle is the same).  Non-
sparse responses (middle row) and high background noise (bottom row) have a larger 
overall activity which may correspond to individual differences in neural and subjective 
sensory sensitivity.  The extent to which the patterns of activity to stimulus A and B are 
uncorrelated would relate to behavioural sensory sensitivity, but will also manifest in 
differences in the degree to which these patterns can be ‘decoded’ externally (e.g. from 
techniques such as multi-voxel-pattern analysis in fMRI).   
 
Neurotypical individual differences 
 There are several lines of direct evidence from neurotypical individual differences 
(i.e. unrelated to autism) that support this model of sensory sensitivity.  In humans, the MRI-
based technique of Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopy (MRS) can estimate local 
concentrations of GABA and glutamate (Schirmer & Auer, 2000).  Higher levels of GABA in 
sensorimotor cortex are correlated with better vibrotactile frequency discrimination (Puts, 
Edden, Evans, McGlone, & McGonigle, 2011) and, within occipital cortex, higher levels of 
GABA are associated with better visual orientation discrimination (Edden, 
Muthukumaraswamy, Freeman, & Singh, 2009).  Continuous theta-burst stimulation (cTBS) 
of the occipital cortex using the technique of TMS (Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation) 
increases the local GABA concentration and enhances the visibility of weak visual stimuli 
(Allen et al., 2014).  These studies all support the assumption that a higher level of GABA 
results in a more differentiated (sparser) neural response (less neural sensory sensitivity) and, 
hence, enhanced behavioural sensory sensitivity.  This research remains largely silent on 
subjective sensory sensitivity.  One study that did examine subjective sensory sensitivity used 
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individual differences in subjective pain thresholds and found correlations with glutamate, 
but not GABA, concentrations in various regions involved in pain perception (Zunhammer et 
al., 2016).  It may be the case that pain sensitivity is different from other senses (as it is an 
inherently affective stimulus), or that GABA and glutamate are linked to different aspects of 
sensitivity.      
Genetic individual differences related to GABA and glutamate functioning have been 
linked to differences in sensory sensitivity.  There are two kinds of GABA receptor (A and 
B), and mutations in the a-subunit of the GABA-A receptor (GARBRB3) have been linked to 
autism (Buxbaum et al., 2002).  Polymorphisms in this gene in the non-clinical child 
population are linked to differences in tactile sensitivity assessed both behaviourally and via 
parental report, with some polymorphisms enhancing and others decreasing sensitivity 
(Tavassoli, Auyeung, Murphy, Baron-Cohen, & Chakrabarti, 2012).  Ugarte et al. (2000) 
found that genetically modified mice lacking this subunit have increased sensitivity (in terms 
of their behavioural responsiveness/aversion) to pain and touch (see also DeLorey et al., 
2011).  By contrast, Ko et al. (2005) found that mice lacking glutamate receptor 5 (GluR5) 
had significantly reduced sensitivity to pain.  However, it is to be noted that in studies 
employing genetic variations it cannot be ascertained whether the effects are specifically 
sensory as opposed to, say, changing the affective nature of a sensory stimulus – given that 
the genetic differences are pervasive across all brain systems. 
 
Clinical groups 
 What about autism?  In support of the model, individual voxels in extrastriate cortex 
show larger visual receptive fields, measured by fMRI, in people with autism and greater 
responsiveness to simple visual stimuli, i.e. less sharp responses at least in the spatial domain 
(Schwarzkopf et al., 2014).  However, the model of Rubenstein and Merzenich (2003) makes 
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the clear prediction that behavioural sensory sensitivity should be impaired in autism (whilst 
being subjectively hyper-sensitive), due to increased neural noise (i.e. propagation of activity 
from stimulus-relevant neurons to stimulus-irrelevant neurons - increased Nm).  However, in 
many domains behavioural sensory sensitivity appears to be normal or superior in autism 
(Laurent Mottron et al., 2013; Simmons et al., 2009).  Some have even taken this as possible 
evidence of enhanced lateral inhibition in perception (Laurent Mottron et al., 2013; Plaisted, 
2001), which runs completely counter to the increased excitation: inhibition ratio model.  
Others have argued that the hypothesized deficit from the increased excitation:inhibition ratio 
model may be more apparent on some sensory tasks than others.  Puts et al. (2014) found that 
people with ASC had no difficulty in vibrotactile frequency discrimination or vibrotactile 
temporal-order judgments, but they did have significant impairments related to the 
modulation of perception, such as through adaptation mechanisms.  They argue that the latter, 
more than the former, may depend on lateral inhibitory functioning (via GABA) for 
‘sharpening’ of neural representations.  But, unfortunately, it is very hard to predict a priori 
which tasks require more/less lateral inhibition, and previous research has shown that 
vibrotactile frequency sensitivity is related to GABA concentrations (Puts et al., 2011) so 
group differences in this task could reasonably have been expected.  
 Robertson, Ratai, and Kanwisher (2016) found that overall levels of GABA and 
glutamate in visual cortex did not differ between an autistic and control group, but the 
correlations between GABA and behaviour did differ between groups.  In the technique of 
binocular rivalry, a different image is projected to each eye but only one image at a time 
tends to be subjectively perceived, and the perceived image alternates over time.  The rate of 
alternation is decreased in autism (i.e. more perceptual stability C. E. Robertson, Kravitz, 
Freyberg, Baron-Cohen, & Baker, 2013).  In controls, there was a significant positive 
relationship between both GABA and glutamate concentrations and increased perceptual 
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stability (although whether GABA and glutamate concentrations are themselves correlated 
was not assessed).  In people with autism, whilst glutamate showed this relationship GABA 
concentrations did not.  Given that there were no group differences in GABA concentrations 
the result suggests that the deficit lies specifically in coupling the neurotransmitter with the 
relevant behaviour.   
 In summary, the model of increased excitation: inhibition ratio makes clear 
predictions about some aspects of sensory sensitivity: specifically worse behavioural 
discrimination, and a larger neural response to sensory stimuli as a result of increased 
glutamate and/or decreased GABA.  There is some evidence for this in terms of neurotypical 
individual differences.  There is far less evidence concerning subjective sensory sensitivity 
(aversion to sounds, touch, light, etc.).  The evidence from autism is also mixed.  There is 
evidence for GABA dysfunction in autism, but the nature of that mechanism is unclear (it is 
unlikely to be the concentration of GABA), and its relationship to sensory sensitivity lacks 
evidence.  More importantly, the theory does not readily predict why people with autism have 
some sensory strengths but it instead predicts a more pervasive pattern of dysfunction.   
 
Sensory Sensitivity due to Different Balance between Priors and Sensory Inputs  
 The increased ratio of excitation: inhibition model argues that sensory 
hypersensitivity arises because the activated sensory representation is less sparse due to 
unchecked propagation of excitatory activity across neuronal populations.  Other theoretical 
accounts make related assumptions but assume it reflects differences in information 
processing within the stimulus-relevant neural code (the K(S) part of the previous equation, 
rather than the Nm or Na parts).  Specifically, it has been argued that the activated neural 
representation may be sparser when it reflects previous perceptual history (e.g. statistical 
properties of the natural environment, Hibbard & O'Hare, 2015) or current predictions (e.g. 
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Rao & Ballard, 1999), relative to unfamiliar or unpredicted sensory inputs.  To translate this 
in to individual differences, people who are unable to predict their sensory experiences or use 
prior perceptual knowledge of the world will be hyper-sensitive, at least in terms of having an 
increased neural response to sensory stimuli.  I will discuss below how this might translate 
into differences in behavioural and subjective sensory sensitivity.   
 
Predictable sensory stimuli have a sparser neural response 
 Hibbard and O’Hare (2015) developed a neural model of primary visual cortex 
responses to uncomfortable images which are known to be implicated in some forms of 
sensory hypersensitivity including migraine and epilepsy.  The model was based on the 
principle of behaviourally optimal coding to reduce the metabolic costs of neural activity.  
Visual images can be decomposed into different spatial frequencies (f) with higher spatial 
frequencies corresponding to finer detail and lower spatial frequencies corresponding to 
broader surface information.  However, in real-world scenes the relative amount of each 
spatial frequency is statistically regular and favours lower frequency components (given by 
the power law 1/fβ where β=0.8 to 1.2 Tolhurst, Tadmour, & Chao, 1992).  Cortical neurons 
in V1 are, by contrast, preferentially tuned to a somewhat higher 2-6 cycle per degree range 
(Devalois, Albrecht, & Thorell, 1982), which may maximise sensitivity to under-represented 
spatial frequencies in the environment (Sharpee et al., 2006) and also lead to a sparser 
response than if the neural code exactly mirrored the properties of the environment.  By 
modelling neural responses to different images, based on physiological data about how they 
are tuned, it was shown that natural images do indeed activate a sparser code (in terms of 
population activity of neurons) whereas images that contain only mid- and high spatial 
frequency components produce much greater activity.  Images with only mid- and high-
spatial frequency components, which are rare in the natural environment, are known to be 
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rated as uncomfortable to view by most people (Juricevic, Land, Wilkins, & Webster, 2010), 
and are more prone to trigger epileptic seizures (Radhakrishnan et al., 2005) and migraines 
(Debne, 1984).  High spatial frequency stimuli also evoke larger visual-evoked potentials in 
people with autism (Vlamings, Jonkman, van Daalen, van der Gaag, & Kemner, 2010) and 
synaesthesia (Barnett et al., 2008), whereas lower spatial frequencies do not.  This offers an 
account as to why some kinds of stimuli may be linked to sensory hypersensitivity more than 
others (i.e. differences in neural activity relating to K(S) in the initial equation) but it is not, 
in itself, an account of individual differences.   
The assumptions relating efficiency to sparse coding derive from Information Theory 
(Shannon, 1948), but are also conceptually related to similar notions derived from the 
Predictive Coding framework or Bayesian brain (e.g. Friston, 2005; Rao & Ballard, 1999).  In 
this framework, incoming sensory signals are compared against top-down knowledge (termed 
‘priors’).  Priors are assumed to be probabilistic, and can consist of representations of 
statistical regularities of the sensory world (e.g. typical distribution of spatial frequencies in 
natural scenes; the fact that light tends to come from above) but also more context-specific 
information such as an expectation that the letter X will be presented next.  A set of neurons, 
assumed to be within sensory cortex itself, compares the sensory signal with these priors and 
computes a ‘prediction error’ (essentially the difference between what is expected and the 
sensory input).  Only if there is a mismatch between these (i.e. the prediction error is large) is 
the sensory signal fed-forward and processed further.  This theory generates the specific 
hypothesis that there will be less sensory neural activity (i.e. sparser codes) when processing 
expected relative to unexpected information.  There are several lines of research consistent 
with this.  The expectation of an upcoming visual stimulus decreases the overall (fMRI) 
activity in early visual cortex, V1, but increases its information content as shown by multi-
voxel pattern analysis (Kok, Jehee, & de Lange, 2012; see also Summerfield, Trittschuh, 
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Monti, Mesulam, & Egner, 2008).  This is consistent with a sharpened (i.e. sparser) and more 
differentiated neural code.   
 
Individual Differences in Sensory Prediction 
The predictive coding framework has been extended to account for individual 
differences, such as those linked with autism, and to the symptom of sensory hyper-
sensitivity more specifically.  Pellicano and Burr (2012) argue that people with autism see the 
world more accurately – as it really is – as a consequence of being less biased by prior 
experiences.  For instance, they can be better able to copy impossible figures (L. Mottron, 
Belleville, & Menard, 1999).   Pellicano and Burr (2012) claim that people with autism still 
possess priors but they may be less precise, and more uncertain.  Moreover, they claim that 
less certain expectations about the sensory world may lead to feelings of being over-
whelmed: i.e. increased subjective sensory sensitivity.  Thus, in this account both behavioural 
and subjective sensory sensitivity go together (both are enhanced), because the individual 
difference lies in greater processing of the sensory signal, K(S), rather than greater noise.  
There is some suggestive evidence to support this.  Autistic people with savant skills (e.g. in 
music, art, memory) have higher subjective sensory sensitivity than autistic controls matched 
in other respects including education and autism symptom severity (Hughes, Ward, Gruffydd, 
Baron-Cohen, & Simner, in press).  There are, however, somewhat different accounts of 
autism within the predictive processing framework (Palmer, Lawson, & Hohwy, 2017; Van 
de Cruys et al., 2014).  Van de Cruys et al. (2014) argues that the difference lies in having too 
precise bottom-up signals thus “Overweighting of irrelevant prediction errors causes sensory 
overload” (p. 661).  This sits in contrast with Pellicano and Burr’s (2012) position that people 
with autism have too imprecise priors, but the net effect is similar: sensory signals are taken 
at face value (and both accounts posit changes in K(S) rather than noise).  Some research has 
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attempted to pull these mechanisms apart.  Lawson, Mathys, and Rees (2017) measured how 
people with autism and controls responded to unexpected events (including using pupil size 
measures) during trial-by-trial variability in the presentation of sensory stimuli.  By fitting the 
results to a formal Bayesian model, they showed that people with autism tend to learn more 
about the volatility (the random fluctuations) which led to non-generalizable predictions and, 
hence, showing less surprise. This kind of process is often called ‘over-fitting’ or treating 
noise as if it is signal (although the sensory system itself may not necessarily be noisier), 
consistent with the model of Van de Cruys et al. (2014  2017).  Hybrid accounts, that depend 
on the ratio of precision of priors to precision of sensory input, may aso help to reconcile 
these different perspectives.   
These predictive coding accounts make specific claims about when perception will be 
impaired in autism and when it is likely to be enhanced.  Two scenarios are considered in 
more detail: multisensory integration, and sensory adaptation.  A tendency to weight bottom-
up signals too precisely (as in Van de Cruys et al., (2014) may result in less integration of 
signals from different sensory modalities and it is to be noted that people with autism show 
less multisensory integration (Stevenson et al., 2014).  If two sensory signals are uncertain 
(less precise) then they will influence each other more, leading to multisensory integration.  
If, however, two sensory signals are more certain (more precise) – as proposed for autism - 
then they are less likely to be integrated.  These unintegrated signals will be treated as two 
(unimodal) sensory events rather than a single (multisensory) event.  This duplication of 
events may be another possible source of ‘sensory overload’ in autism and in other groups in 
which multisensory integration appears to be reduced including synaesthesia (Sinke et al., 
2014) and migraine (Brighina et al., 2015).  However, few studies have contrasted subjective 
sensory sensitivity (e.g. assessed via questionnaire) and multisensory processing directly.  
One study that did found that subjective sensory hyper-sensitivity was related to reduced 
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visuo-tactile temporal acuity and increased visual bias when presented with multisensory 
stimuli in both autistic and neurotypical individuals (Poole, Gowen, Warren, & Poliakoff, 
2017).   
There is also evidence that conditions linked to subjective sensory hyper-sensitivity 
show less effects of perceptual adaptation (e.g. in autism, Pellicano, Jeffery, Burr, & Rhodes, 
2007; Puts et al., 2014).  This is consistent with the notion that the predictability of the 
stimulus is not being coded in the normal way.  Adaptation refers to a weaker neural response 
to a repeated, or continuous, sensory stimulus, such that the stimulus becomes less likely to 
elicit a behavioural response (termed habituation).  Everyday examples of this might be the 
smell of someone’s perfume or the noise of a digger outside.  For most people, these stimuli 
may be intense and aversive to begin with, but will become subjectively less intense over 
time, perhaps to the extent that they are no longer consciously perceived.  Thus, high sensory 
sensitivity could be an outcome of weaker adaptation mechanisms that prevent ongoing, 
normal sensory experiences from being attenuated (e.g. the feel of clothes labels, the hum of 
a computer).  Takarae and Sweeney (2017) also speculate on how reduced adaptation could 
also lead to clinical symptoms of hypo-sensitivity: a problem in adapting to old stimuli may 
reduce the capacity to prioritise (and hence, notice) new sensory stimuli.  Less adaptation 
could also explain greater perceptual stability during binocular rivalry in autism (C. E. 
Robertson et al., 2013), because the dominant percept does not spontaneously weaken.  There 
is also evidence for weaker adaptation in migraine, assessed using EEG evoked potentials, in 
several modalities and not just vision (Brighina, Palermo, & Fierro, 2009).  Synaesthetes 
show longer duration (i.e. less adaptation) to the McCollough effect, but normal duration of 
retinal after-images (Ramachandran & Marcus, 2017).  Again, changes in adaptation will 
most likely reflect how the sensory signal is updated over time (i.e. K(S)), but less neural 
noise could also contribute to weaker adaptation.  In all cases, the evidence is indirect and 
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future research needs to link individual differences in adaptation to measures of subjective 
sensory sensitivity.   
Finally, the predictive coding framework has a particular way of framing the 
relationship between attention (commonly thought of as the selection of sensory stimuli for 
further processing) and perception.  Within the predictive coding account, attention is defined 
as optimisation of precision; that is, paying attention to some sensory signal means that the 
precision weighting on this signal is increased so that it has more influence (Hohwy, 2012).  
In the case of endogenous attention, subjects increase precision (assign attention) of a signal 
to particular spatial locations based on top-down expectations (in this case about expectations 
of precision, rather than expectations of the stimulus itself).  Exogenous attention, however, 
is thought to be a process of assigning greater precision-weighting to stimuli that are very 
salient based on low-level features, for example, objects with sudden onsets or high contrast.  
So to extrapolate this to van der Cruys et al.’s (2014) model, the suggestion that people with 
autism assign too great a precision to sensory signals is the same as saying that they are 
hyper-attentive.   
 
Increased Sensory Sensitivity due to Differences in Endogenous Noise 
 
 Endogenous noise (Na in the equations above) occurs both in the presence and 
absence of sensory signals.  An increase in the level of endogenous noise would have several 
effects.  It would increase the overall level of neural activity (i.e. increased neural sensory 
sensitivity and, by implication, increased subjective sensory sensitivity).  It would also 
increase variability from time to time: perhaps leading to both reports of hyper- and hypo-
sensitivity.  Although behavioural sensory sensitivity would tend to be reduced (because the 
signal:noise ratio is reduced) in some circumstances it could be enhanced through the process 
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termed stochastic resonance (McDonnell & Abbott, 2009).  In stochastic resonance, weak 
sensory signals that are just below the threshold for detection/discrimination can be boosted 
by the presence of noise as shown in Figure 2.  In their review of visual abilities in autism, 
Simmons et al. (2009) concluded that increased endogenous noise might explain many of the 
perceptual difficulties but also some of the enhancements.  For example, some studies show 
both perceptual advantages and disadvantages in the same autistic participants (Bertone, 
Mottron, Jelenic, & Faubert, 2005) which can be characterised as single versus multiple 
sources of noise; where a single source could be advantageous (due to stochastic resonance) 
but multiple sources are disruptive when combined.  This review also noted the large 
variability in inter-individual perceptual thresholds in autism, consistent with a noise 
explanation.  Other evidence that could potentially be consistent with increased endogenous 
noise is the fact that both autistic traits and increased sensory sensitivity, varying in the 
neurotypical population, are linked to anomalous perceptual experiences in everyday life 
(Horder, Wilson, Mendez, & Murphy, 2014). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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Figure 2: The summation of sub-threshold noise and sub-threshold signal can boost 
behavioural sensory sensitivity, termed stochastic resonance.  Too little noise will result in no 
benefit.  Too much noise will also be deleterious, and result in ‘false perceptions’. 
 
 At this juncture it is worthwhile contrasting this account with others discussed so far 
given that all emphasise a role for neural noise (but in different ways).  Firstly, the predictive 
coding account of van de Cruys et al. (2014) does not assume a higher level of endogenous 
noise but, rather, assumes that normal sensory noise is over-interpreted in autism (i.e. treated 
as signal).  The increased excitation:inhibition account does predict increased neural noise 
but, in this case, it is primarily stimulus-evoked noise (Nm) that leads to a less differentiated 
response.  These different interpretations could be teased apart empirically.  For instance, the 
method of tRNS (transcranial random noise stimulation) can be used to measure the level of 
stochastic resonance over visual cortex (van der Groen & Wenderoth, 2016).  This study 
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found that adding a medium amount of neural noise enhanced detectability of visual stimuli 
but too little noise or too much noise did not.  To translate to individual differences: if an 
individual already had an optimal amount of neural noise then adding more would worsen 
performance, but if an individual had too little noise then adding tRNS would boost 
performance.  An alternative method uses TMS.  High levels of endogenous noise over visual 
regions should be associated with lower TMS phosphene thresholds: if the brain requires less 
external stimulation to elicit some behaviour/experience (e.g. a phosphene) then we can 
conclude that it has higher levels of intrinsic excitability.  In terms of individual differences, 
it has been shown that lower phosphene thresholds (Terhune et al., 2015) and lower motor 
thresholds (Stagg et al., 2011) are linked to increased glutamate (not GABA) in visual and 
motor cortices respectively.  It remains to be shown how this relates to subjective sensory 
sensitivity measures, if at all.   
In contrast to Simmons et al., (2009), Davis and Plaisted-Grant (2015) argue that 
autism is linked to less endogenous neural noise.  They cite a variety of evidence including 
that less noisy (and more precise) sensory signals are less likely to be combined (similar to 
predictive coding), and greater perceptual stability in autism (e.g. in tasks such as binocular 
rivalry).  However, this theory doesn’t obviously speak to atypical subjective sensory 
sensitivity such as the DSM-V criteria.  For instance, it is not clear how less endogenous 
neural noise explains the ‘sensory overload’ descriptions of hyper-sensitivity.  However, the 
low versus high noise accounts can be empirically disentangled using methods such as tRNS 
and TMS.  Moreover, these approaches can be extended beyond autism.  For instance, 
increased neural noise accounts have been applied to migraine (O’Hare & Hibbard, 2016).   
 
Increased Sensory Sensitivity due to Altered Network Connectivity  
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One suggestion is that hyper-connnectivity to/from sensory regions leads to both 
increased subjective sensory sensitivity and increased neural activity (although that neural 
activity may be propagated away from sensory cortices).  Within the framework outlined 
above, this most closely fits with an increased signal-induced noise (Nm).  Therefore, this 
most closely resembles the Increased Excitation-Inhibition Ratio model.  In the increased 
excitation:inhibition account, the noise effectively spreads within the stimulated sensory 
system and will necessarily affect behavioural sensory sensitivity.    However, if changes of 
connectivity occur at other spatial scales (e.g. longer range connections between sensory 
systems and the amygdala) then the impact on behavioural sensory sensitivity is uncertain 
(and potentially non-existent). 
With regards to autism, there is strong evidence of atypical structural and functional 
brain connectivity although the pattern is complex.  Functionally, resting state fMRI reveals 
large-scale hypo-connectivity between many regions although some regions display hyper-
connectivity, including connectivity between subcortical (thalamic, basal ganglia) regions 
and primary sensory and motor regions (Di Martino et al., 2014).  In terms of structural 
connectivity, assessed with DTI, the organisation of the white matter tends to be less coherent 
in autism (Anagnostou & Taylor, 2011).  Grey matter thickness can be increased in autism, 
and this may be a marker of increased local connectivity (Raznahan et al., 2010).  Grey-
matter differences are age-dependent with visual and auditory regions showing an atypical 
age-related increase in autism, but other regions (e.g. prefrontal) showing the opposite pattern 
(Watanabe & Rees, 2016).  What is far less clear is how this connectivity profile is related to 
the profile of atypical sensory sensitivity documented for autism.  It is possible that increased 
thalamic to cortical sensory signals leads to atypical development of these target areas.  It is 
also unclear whether similar individual differences in connectivity are implicated in other 
conditions linked to atypical sensory sensitivity.  Synaesthesia has been linked to a profile of 
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hyper-connectivity across multiple brain regions (Hänggi, Wotruba, & Jäncke, 2011; Rouw, 
Scholte, & Colizoli, 2011).  Neurotypical variation in hyper-sensitivity to noise has been 
shown to be linked to increased grey matter in auditory cortex but also a number of non-
sensory limbic regions including amygdala and hippocampus (Kliuchko et al., 2018).  Whilst 
migraine has been linked to reduced grey matter volumes in certain regions (Dai et al., 2015), 
other research that specifically examined visual cortical regions (MT+ and V3A) found 
increased grey matter as well as sub-cortical white matter differences in visual pathways 
(Granziera, DaSilva, Snyder, Tuch, & Hadjikhani, 2006). 
A number of brain imaging studies using fMRI have suggested a link between sensory 
hyper-sensitivity and increased activity in limbic regions (amygdala, hippocampus). Green et 
al. (2013) presented mildly aversive auditory and visual stimuli to children with autism and 
neurotypical controls.  The autism group showed increased BOLD responses in primary 
sensory cortices and also amygdala, hippocampus, and orbitofrontal cortex.  In both groups, 
the degree of this activity was positively correlated with individual differences in reports of 
sensory sensitivity made by a parent.  A subsequent study report similar findings using tactile 
stimuli (Green et al., 2015).  Using functional connectivity analysis, Green et al. (2017) found 
that increased connectivity between the thalamus and amygdala was linked to the sensory 
hyper-sensitivity in autism, and they speculated that the amygdala may then lead to a 
heightened responsiveness in sensory cortex (i.e. an amygdala-driven attentional alerting 
mechanism).     
   
 A connectivity-based account of sensory sensitivity in autism has been developed by 
Markram and Markram (2010), termed Intense World Theory.  The Intense World Theory 
was initially motivated by the clinical observation that pregnant mothers treated with the anti-
epileptic drug, Valproic Acid (VPA), had a high incidence of autistic-like symptoms in their 
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offspring (Moore et al., 2000).  The vast majority of subsequent evidence comes from animal 
models of offspring treated with VPA.  The cardinal behavioural and neurophysiological 
symptom in these animals is a hyper-reactivity to stimuli (notably sensory and affective 
stimuli), including a lack of habituation to repeated sensory stimuli.  Superficially, this 
appears to resemble the increased excitation:inhibition model discussed earlier.  However, the 
evidence suggests that the mechanism of action of VPA does not disrupt overall excitation 
and inhibition (at least not to sensory stimuli) but, instead, leads to a 50% increase in 
connectivity affecting both excitatory and inhibitory neurons (Rinaldi, Silberberg, & 
Markram, 2008).  It is this increased connectivity that drives hyper-reactivity (increased 
neural sensory sensitivity) and is assumed to drive subjective sensory sensitivity (an ‘intense 
world’).  With regards to behavioural sensitivity, the claim is that the increased local 
connectivity enhances perceptual ability but makes sensory processing more autonomous (i.e. 
less biased by context or global cues).  Further evidence is clearly needed to link the Intense 
World Theory (driven primarily by animal models) to human neuroscience and behaviour. 
 
 
Summary and Outstanding Questions 
 
This manuscript has attempted to sketch out a broad framework for considering 
individual differences in sensory sensitivity linked to both neurotypical variation, and 
neurodevelopmental group-based differences.  It has been suggested that future research 
needs to more clearly articulate different ways in which sensory sensitivity can be described.  
Specifically, three concepts of sensory sensitivity are described: subjective sensory sensitivity 
(strong feelings of aversion/intensity that define clinical symptoms); neural sensory 
sensitivity (the degree of neural activity induced by sensory stimuli); and behavioural sensory 
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sensitivity (detection and discrimination of sensory stimuli).  The extent to which these 
different facets of sensory sensitivity are related can be understood in terms of a simple 
consideration of signal detection from neural signal and noise.  This is extended from 
previous accounts (e.g. relating to migraine; O’Hare and Hibbard, 2016) to offer a unifying 
framework for exploring sensory sensitivity across different conditions (e.g. autism, 
migraine, synaesthesia).  The framework is discussed, in more concrete terms, by linking it to 
four existing theoretical accounts of atypical sensory sensitivity: increased excitation-to-
inhibition ratio; predictive coding; increased neural noise; and atypical brain connectivity.  
These four accounts all have certain strengths and weaknesses in explaining the available 
evidence that make hard to adjudicate between them.  These are summarised in Table 2 and 
reflect a largely personal perspective on the current state of the field.  An over-arching 
criticism of the field is that no existing account convincingly links together the three different 
aspects of sensory sensitivity delineated at the outset of this paper (subjective, behavioural 
and neural). 
 To some extent, these different accounts of atypical sensory sensitivity are not 
mutually exclusive.  This is partly because they are pitched at different levels of analysis, to 
use Marr’s term. Marr (1982) described how explanations can occur at three different levels: 
computational (what problem is being solved and what is the approach for solving it); 
algorithmic (how the problem is solved); and implementational (how the solution is 
implemented physically).  Accounts such as predictive coding, are couched primarily at the 
algorithmic level whereas other accounts such as increased excitation:inhibition or Intense 
World Theory are couched primarily at the implementational level.  It is, of course, 
conceivable that differences in neurotransmitter functionality or neural connectivity drive 
algorithmic differences, resulting in differences in the way that sensory stimuli are predicted.  
At the computational level (in Marr’s terms), it is suggested that the basic problem being 
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solved is that of maximising behavioural sensory sensitivity (because this is functionally 
adaptive) whilst minimizing neural sensory sensitivity (because a high amount of neural 
responsiveness is metabolically costly).  However, different individuals may adopt somewhat 
different solutions to this problem owing to intrinsic differences present in their ‘software’ 
(cognition) or ‘hardware’ (neural architecture).  It is these different solutions to the same 
problem that give rise to individual differences in sensory sensitivity. 
To give one example, Shriki, Saleh and Ward (2017) developed a computational 
model of synaesthesia in which the learning algorithm was set to maximise behavioural 
sensory sensitivity of two ‘modalities’ but under a variety of different starting conditions (e.g. 
differences in plasticity, differences in the relative sensitivities of the modalities).  The extent 
to which the model exhibited a synaesthetic response (i.e. a sensory stimulus to one modality 
eliciting activity in both modalities; a less sparse neural response) depended on these atypical 
starting conditions (most solutions did not exhibit this synaesthetic behaviour).  However, it 
is important to note that these atypical solutions can, for that individual, still be statistically 
optimal.   
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Table 2: An evaluation of the four different theoretical accounts of individual differences in sensory sensitivity 
Theoretical Accounts Strengths Weaknesses Outstanding Questions 
Increased Sensory Sensitivity due 
to an Increased Excitation-to-
Inhibition Ratio 
 
 Good evidence of a link 
between GABA/glutamate 
concentrations and 
neurotypical individual 
differences in behavioural 
sensory sensitivity 
 Evidence of GABA 
dysfunction in ASD but less 
clear how this is linked to 
behavioural and subjective 
sensory sensitivity 
 Few studies have explored 
GABA/glutamate in terms of 
subjective sensory sensitivity 
(clinical symptoms) 
 Does not readily explain the 
pattern of perceptual 
strengths (as well as 
weaknesses) in ASD 
 Is an increased 
excitation:inhibition ratio 
linked both to increased 
subjective sensory sensitivity 
and reduced behavioural 
sensory sensitivity? 
 If so, which conditions does 
this apply to and is it specific 
to particular sensory 
modalities? 
Sensory Sensitivity due to 
Different Balance between Priors 
and Sensory Inputs 
 Makes testable predictions 
about the kinds of scenarios 
in which perception may be 
enhanced or impaired 
 Less adaptation (less 
attenuation of predictable 
stimuli?) has been found in a 
variety of conditions linked 
to atypical sensory sensitivity  
 Theory is underspecified at 
the implementational level 
 Lack of evidence linking this 
account to subjective sensory 
sensitivity 
 What neurobiological 
differences lead to 
differences in predictive 
processing and why? 
 How is it possible to 
distinguish between less 
reliance on priors versus 
overly precise predictions? 
Increased Sensory Sensitivity due 
to Differences in Endogenous 
Noise 
 May account for unusual 
perceptual experiences (e.g. 
migraine aura) 
 Existing accounts tend not to 
distinguish different sources 
of noise (termed here as 
additive and multiplicative) 
 Can less endogenous noise 
(as opposed to more) explain 
high subjective sensory 
sensitivity? 
Increased Sensory Sensitivity due 
to Altered Network Connectivity 
 Clear evidence of differences 
in structural/functional 
connectivity in conditions 
linked to atypical sensory 
sensitivity 
 Less clear predictions about 
whether behavioural sensory 
sensitivity correlates 
positively or negatively with 
subjective sensory sensitivity 
 Which specific aspects of 
connectivity (e.g. small 
world features) are relevant 
to atypical sensory 
sensitivity? 
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 Some evidence that these 
differences correlate with 
subjective sensory sensitivity 
 What is the role of atypical 
connectivity to regions such 
as amygdala in subjective 
sensory sensitivity? 
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Outstanding Issues 
 The remaining sections consider specific research questions, and identify possible 
methods for addressing them. 
 
What is the neural basis of atypical sensory sensitivity? 
 As noted at the outset, there is a pervasive assumption that increased subjective 
sensory sensitivity and increased neural sensory sensitivity go hand-in-hand.  However, a 
more detailed consideration of the theories and evidence suggests that this question should be 
broken down into more specific questions and hypotheses.   
 One of the key questions to be resolved is whether increased neural activity is linked 
to the amount of activity per se or the number of active ‘units’ (neurons, voxels, etc.).  That 
is, the extent to which activated neural representations differ in activity per se or in terms of 
sparseness, and the extent to which these patterns of activity are stable or variable over time 
(the latter being indicative of noise).  Different theories make different predictions 
concerning this.  It also needs to be determined whether these differences only manifest 
themselves in the presence of a sensory stimulus but also in its absence (if level of 
background noise differ). It is also unclear which regions in sensory cortex are linked to 
individual differences in sensory sensitivity, and whether concomitant activity in non-sensory 
regions (e.g. amygdala) is a better predictor.  Finally, studies involving TMS (individual 
differences in phosphene threshold) and tRNS are important for assessing individual 
differences in neural noise. 
 
What is the relationship between different conditions with atypical sensory sensitivity? 
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 Although it has been argued that there is no necessary reason why different conditions 
linked to atypical sensory sensitivity should have the same cause, this is essentially an 
empirical question.  This is best addressed by applying common methods across multiple 
conditions; an approach that is, hitherto, lacking.  We have attempted to explore this 
comparing synaesthesia and autism (Ward et al., 2017), two conditions which occur together 
more than chance (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 2013), but the approach can be extended more 
widely. 
 One feature that has been reported across multiple conditions linked to sensory hyper-
sensitivity is less adaptation and habituation; i.e. such that repeated or prolonged sensory 
stimulation does not lead to a large drop-off in the neural or behavioural response.  However, 
different measures of adaptation have been used across different studies and the specific link 
with subjective sensory sensitivity remains untested.  It is also to be noted that even if 
reduced adaptation were a common feature across conditions, there could be differences in 
the way this is implemented (e.g. failure to suppress from top-down priors, or less build-up of 
noise).   
 
What is the relationship between sensory sensitivity and other clinical symptoms? 
 The extent to which atypical sensory sensitivity is linked to other clinical symptoms 
or other cognitive differences remains to be tested.  Historically, sensory sensitivity has been 
linked to a sensitive personality type that includes introversion and increased emotionality 
(Aron & Aron, 1997).  This idea has parallels going back to the Eighteenth century notions of 
‘sensibility’.  Some of these personality characteristics (e.g. preference for solitude) would 
perhaps now fall within autism spectrum tendencies, but some accounts continue to make a 
link between sensory and emotional sensitivity.  For instance, the Intense World Theory 
makes the claim that sensory hyper-sensitivity and emotional hyper-sensitivity are two co-
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occurring outcomes of the atypical brain development underpinning autism (Markram & 
Markram, 2010).  Anxiety is a common clinical feature of autism and is correlated with 
subjective sensory hyper-sensitivity (Mazurek et al., 2013).  Some theories suggest that 
anxiety is linked to heightened awareness of one’s bodily responsiveness or interoception 
(Domschke, Stevens, Pfleiderer, & Gerlach, 2010).  Does subjective hyper-sensitivity to 
internal bodily signals co-occur with hyper-sensitivity to external senses such as sounds and 
vision?  This would be an important area to explore.   
 
What is hypo-sensitivity? 
 Most theories focus on sensory hyper-sensitivity perhaps because it is conceptually 
easier to explain and because it is a more important clinical symptom than hypo-sensitivity.  
Nevertheless, the apparent association between hyper- and hypo-sensitivities (Horder et al., 
2014; Robertson & Simmons, 2013) remains an important area to investigate.  These ideas 
also need more clarity in terms of how they are defined and measured.  For instance, low 
responsivity to sensory stimulation could be interpreted as ‘hypo-sensitivity’ but it need not 
be: sensitivity and responsivity are separate constructs (Pluess, 2015).  Several accounts have 
been discussed in this paper, and these make testable predictions.  For instance, it is possible 
for someone to have subjective sensory hyper-sensitivity but, at the same time, be 
behaviourally hypo-sensitive to stimuli (i.e. less able to notice or discriminate them).  It may 
also be the case that poor adaptation means that sensory stimuli are not prioritised in a typical 
way (i.e. such that old stimuli are less perceptually salient, so that new stimuli can be more 
easily detected).  The relationship, if any, between hypo-sensitivity and repetitive sensory-
motor acts (e.g. flicking ones fingers in front of the eyes) also needs to be understood as these 
ideas have sometimes been conflated.  It may, for instance, be the case that repetitive acts are 
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repeated simply because their effects do not diminish in the same way over time (less 
adaptation) for some people. 
 
What stimulus properties elicit hyper-sensitive (or hypo-sensitive) responses? 
 Little is known about the particular characteristics of sensory stimuli that are known 
to elicit strong responses in people who self-report high subjective sensory sensitivity, 
although the general properties of stimuli known to be rated as uncomfortable have been 
studied (auditory: e.g. Kumar, Forster, Bailey, & Griffiths, 2008; visual: e.g. Juricevic, et al., 
2010).  The suggestion that sensory stimuli that have a natural tendency to elicit a large, non-
sparse neural response may be linked to hyper-sensitivity is an idea that can be explored 
across different sensory systems.  It is sometimes reported that some individuals (e.g. in 
misophonia) have their own idiosyncratic triggers, but whether there are commonalities 
across such cases remains to be determined.  If there are individuals for whom a very small 
set of triggers can be identified then a role of learning would need to be ruled out.  However, 
this explanation would be less convincing for those who report a more pervasive pattern of 
sensitivities.  Preliminary evidence suggests a heritable component to increased sensory 
sensitivity (Donaldson, Stauder, & Donkers, 2017).  A possible middle-ground is that people 
with high sensory sensitivity have an increased aversion/intensity to a wide-range of sensory 
stimuli but, over and above that, some of these triggers (e.g. the sound of chewing) acquire a 
special status (akin to phobic responses). 
 
Summary 
This paper has critically evaluated the concept of individual differences in sensory 
sensitivity, explored its possible underlying neurobiological basis, and presented a roadmap 
for future research in this area.  I hope that this will facilitate dialogue between researchers 
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working in different areas through the consideration of a common conceptual framework and 
common methodologies that enable the similarities and differences across conditions to be 
better understood. 
 
Acknowledgements 
Reny Baykova assisted with a preliminary literature review of the field.  Jenny Bosten and 
Hugo Critchley provided constructive comments on an earlier draft.   
 
References 
 
Allen, C. P. G., Dunkley, B. T., Muthukumaraswamy, S. D., Edden, R., Evans, C. J., Sumner, 
P., . . . Chambers, C. D. (2014). Enhanced Awareness Followed Reversible Inhibition 
of Human Visual Cortex: A Combined TMS, MRS and MEG Study. PLoS One, 9(6). 
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0100350 
Anagnostou, E., & Taylor, M. J. (2011). Review of neuroimaging in autism spectrum 
disorders: what have we learned and where we go from here. Molecular Autism, 2. 
doi: 10.1186/2040-2392-2-4 
Aron, E. N., & Aron, A. (1997). Sensory-processing sensitivity and its relation to introversion 
and emotionality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73(2), 345-368. doi: 
10.1037/0022-3514.73.2.345 
Atick, J. J. (1992). Could Information Theory provide an ecological theory of sensory 
processing? Network-Computation in Neural Systems, 3(2), 213-251. doi: 
10.1088/0954-898x/3/2/009 
Barnett, K. J., Foxe, J. J., Malholm, S., Kelly, S. P., Shalgi, S., Mitchell, K. J., & Newell, F. 
N. (2008). Differences in early sensory-perceptual processing in synesthesia: A visual 
evoked potential study. NeuroImage, 15, 605-613.  
Baron-Cohen, S., Johnson, D., Asher, J., Wheelwright, S., Fisher, S. E., Gregersen, P. K., & 
Allison, C. (2013). Is synaesthesia more common in autism? Molecular Autism, 4(1), 
40.  
Belluscio, B. A., Jin, L., Watters, V., Lee, T. H., & Hallett, M. (2011). Sensory sensitivity to 
external stimuli in Tourette syndrome patients. Movement Disorders, 26(14), 2538-
2543. doi: 10.1002/mds.23977 
Bertone, A., Mottron, L., Jelenic, P., & Faubert, J. (2005). Enhanced and diminished visuo-
spatial information processing in autism depends on stimulus complexity. Brain, 128, 
2430-2441. doi: 10.1093/brain/awh561 
Bijlenga, D., Tjon-Ka-Jie, J. Y. M., Schuijers, F., & Kooij, J. J. S. (2017). Atypical sensory 
profiles as core features of adult ADHD, irrespective of autistic symptoms. European 
Psychiatry, 43, 51-57. doi: 10.1016/j.eurpsy.2017.02.481 
42 
 
Brighina, F., Bolognini, N., Cosentino, G., Maccora, S., Paladino, P., Baschi, R., . . . Fierro, 
B. (2015). Visual cortex hyperexcitability in migraine in response to sound-induced 
flash illusions. Neurology, 84(20), 2057-2061.  
Brighina, F., Palermo, A., & Fierro, B. (2009). Cortical inhibition and habituation to evoked 
potentials: relevance for pathophysiology of migraine. Journal of Headache and Pain, 
10(2), 77-84. doi: 10.1007/s10194-008-0095-x 
Brout, J. J., Edelstein, M., Erfanian, M., Mannino, M., Miller, L. J., Rouw, R., . . . Rosenthal, 
M. Z. (2018). Investigating Misophonia: A Review of the Empirical Literature, 
Clinical Implications, and a Research Agenda. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 12. doi: 
10.3389/fnins.2018.00036 
Buxbaum, J. D., Silverman, J. M., Smith, C. J., Greenberg, D. A., Kilifarski, M., Reichert, J., 
. . . Vitale, R. (2002). Association between a GABRB3 polymorphism and autism. 
Molecular Psychiatry, 7(3), 311-316. doi: 10.1038/sj/mp/4001011 
Coghlan, S., Horder, J., Inkster, B., Mendez, M. A., Murphy, D. G., & Nutt, D. J. (2012). 
GABA system dysfunction in autism and related disorders: From synapse to 
symptoms. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 36(9), 2044-2055. doi: 
10.1016/j.neubiorev.2012.07.005 
Coutts, L. V., Cooper, C. E., Elwell, C. E., & Wilkins, A. J. (2012). Time course of the 
haemodynamic response to visual stimulation in migraine, measured using near-
infrared spectroscopy. Cephalalgia, 32(8), 621-629. doi: 10.1177/0333102412444474 
Crane, L., Goddard, L., & Pring, L. (2009). Sensory processing in adults with autism 
spectrum disorders. Autism, 13(3), 215-228. doi: 10.1177/1362361309103794 
Dai, Z., Zhong, J., Xiao, P., Zhu, Y., Chen, F., Pan, P., & Shi, H. (2015). GRAY MATTER 
CORRELATES OF MIGRAINE AND GENDER EFFECT: A META-ANALYSIS 
OF VOXEL-BASED MORPHOMETRY STUDIES. Neuroscience, 299, 88-96. doi: 
10.1016/j.neuroscience.2015.04.066 
Davis, G., & Plaisted-Grant, K. (2015). Low endogenous neural noise in autism. Autism, 
19(3), 351-362. doi: 10.1177/1362361314552198 
Debne, L. M. (1984). Visual stimuli as migraine trigger factors. London, UK: Pitman Books. 
DeLorey, T. M., Sahbaie, P., Hashemi, E., Li, W. W., Salehi, A., & Clark, D. J. (2011). 
Somatosensory and sensorimotor consequences associated with the heterozygous 
disruption of the autism candidate gene, Gabrb3. Behavioural Brain Research, 216(1), 
36-45. doi: 10.1016/j.bbr.2010.06.032 
Devalois, R. L., Albrecht, D. G., & Thorell, L. G. (1982). Spatial frequency selectivity of 
cells in macaque visual cortex. Vision Research, 22, 545–559.  
Di Martino, A., Yan, C. G., Li, Q., Denio, E., Castellanos, F. X., Alaerts, K., . . . Milham, M. 
P. (2014). The autism brain imaging data exchange: towards a large-scale evaluation 
of the intrinsic brain architecture in autism. Molecular Psychiatry, 19(6), 659-667. 
doi: 10.1038/mp.2013.78 
Domschke, K., Stevens, S., Pfleiderer, B., & Gerlach, A. L. (2010). Interoceptive sensitivity 
in anxiety and anxiety disorders: An overview and integration of neurobiological 
findings. Clinical Psychology Review, 30(1), 1-11. doi: 10.1016/j.cpr.2009.08.008 
Dunn, W. (1999). Sensory profile. San Antonio, TX: Psychological Corporation. 
Edden, R. A. E., Muthukumaraswamy, S. D., Freeman, T. C. A., & Singh, K. D. (2009). 
Orientation Discrimination Performance Is Predicted by GABA Concentration and 
Gamma Oscillation Frequency in Human Primary Visual Cortex. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 29(50), 15721-15726. doi: 10.1523/jneurosci.4426-09.2009 
Friston, K. J. (2005). A theory of cortical responses. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society B-Biological Sciences, 360(1456), 815-836. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2005.1622 
43 
 
Granziera, C., DaSilva, A. F. M., Snyder, J., Tuch, D. S., & Hadjikhani, N. (2006). 
Anatomical alterations of the visual motion processing network in migraine with and 
without aura. Plos Medicine, 3(10), 1915-1921. doi: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030402 
Green, S. A., Hernandez, L., Bookheimer, S. Y., & Dapretto, M. (2017). Reduced 
Modulation of Thalamocortical Connectivity during Exposure to Sensory Stimuli in 
ASD. Autism Research, 10(5), 801-809. doi: 10.1002/aur.1726 
Green, S. A., Hernandez, L., Tottenham, N., Krasileva, K., Bookheimer, S. Y., & Dapretto, 
M. (2015). Neurobiology of Sensory Overresponsivity in Youth With Autism 
Spectrum Disorders. Jama Psychiatry, 72(8), 778-786. doi: 
10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2015.0737 
Green, S. A., Rudie, J. D., Colich, N. L., Wood, J. J., Shirinyan, D., Hernandez, L., . . . 
Bookheimer, S. Y. (2013). Overreactive Brain Responses to Sensory Stimuli in Youth 
With Autism Spectrum Disorders. Journal of the American Academy of Child and 
Adolescent Psychiatry, 52(11), 1158-1172. doi: 10.1016/j.jaac.2013.08.004 
Han, S., Tai, C., Westenbroek, R. E., Yu, F. H., Cheah, C. S., Potter, G. B., . . . Catterall, W. 
A. (2012). Autistic-like behaviour in Scn1a(+/-) mice and rescue by enhanced GABA-
mediated neurotransmission. Nature, 489(7416), 385-390. doi: 10.1038/nature11356 
Hänggi, J., Wotruba, D., & Jäncke, L. (2011). Globally altered structural brain network 
topology in grapheme-color synesthesia. Journal of Neuroscience, 31(15), 5816-5828.  
Hibbard, P. B., & O'Hare, L. (2015). Uncomfortable images produce non-sparse responses in 
a model of primary visual cortex. Royal Society Open Science, 2(2). doi: 
10.1098/rsos.140535 
Hohwy, J. (2012). Attention and conscious perception in the hypothesis testing brain. 
Frontiers in psychology, 3. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00096 
Horder, J., Wilson, C. E., Mendez, M. A., & Murphy, D. G. (2014). Autistic Traits and 
Abnormal Sensory Experiences in Adults. Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders, 44(6), 1461-1469. doi: 10.1007/s10803-013-2012-7 
Hughes, J. E. A., Ward, J., Gruffydd, E., Baron-Cohen, S., & Simner, J. (in press). Savant 
Syndrome has a distinct psychological profile in autism Molecular Autism.  
Isaacson, J. S., & Scanziani, M. (2011). How Inhibition Shapes Cortical Activity. Neuron, 
72(2), 231-243. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2011.09.027 
Juricevic, I., Land, L., Wilkins, A. J., & Webster, M. A. (2010). Visual discomfort and 
natural image statistics. Perception, 39, 884–899.  
Kliuchko, M., Puolivali, T., Heinonen-Guzejev, M., Tervaniemi, M., Toiviainen, P., Sams, 
M., & Brattico, E. (2018). Neuroanatomical substrate of noise sensitivity. 
NeuroImage, 167, 309-315. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2017.11.041 
Ko, S., Zhao, M. G., Toyoda, H., Qiu, C. S., & Zhuo, M. (2005). Altered Behavioral 
responses to noxious stimuli and fear in glutamate receptor 5 (GluR5)- or GluR6-
deficient mice. Journal of Neuroscience, 25(4), 977-984. doi: 10.1523/jneurosci.4059-
04.2005 
Kok, P., Jehee, J. F. M., & de Lange, F. P. (2012). Less Is More: Expectation Sharpens 
Representations in the Primary Visual Cortex. Neuron, 75(2), 265-270. doi: 
10.1016/j.neuron.2012.04.034 
Lawson, R. P., Mathys, C., & Rees, G. (2017). Adults with autism overestimate the volatility 
of the sensory environment. Nature Neuroscience, 20(9), 1293-+. doi: 
10.1038/nn.4615 
Leopold, D. A. (2012). Primary Visual Cortex: Awareness and Blindsight. In S. E. Hyman 
(Ed.), Annual Review of Neuroscience, Vol 35 (Vol. 35, pp. 91-109). 
44 
 
Markram, K., & Markram, H. (2010). The Intense World Theory - a unifying theory of the 
neurobiology of autism. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 4. doi: 
10.3389/fnhum.2010.00224 
Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A computational investigation into the human representation and 
processing of visual information. San Francisco: Freeman and Company. 
Mazurek, M. O., Vasa, R. A., Kalb, L. G., Kanne, S. M., Rosenberg, D., Keefer, A., . . . 
Lowery, L. A. (2013). Anxiety, Sensory Over-Responsivity, and Gastrointestinal 
Problems in Children with Autism Spectrum Disorders. Journal of Abnormal Child 
Psychology, 41(1), 165–176.  
McDonnell, M. D., & Abbott, D. (2009). What Is Stochastic Resonance? Definitions, 
Misconceptions, Debates, and Its Relevance to Biology. PLoS Computational 
Biology, 5(5). doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000348 
Moore, S. J., Turnpenny, P., Quinn, A., Glover, S., Lloyd, D. J., Montgomery, T., & Dean, J. 
C. S. (2000). A clinical study of 57 children with fetal anticonvulsant syndromes. 
Journal of Medical Genetics, 37(7), 489-497. doi: 10.1136/jmg.37.7.489 
Mottron, L., Belleville, S., & Menard, E. (1999). Local bias in autistic subjects as evidenced 
by graphic tasks: Perceptual hierarchization or working memory deficit? Journal of 
Child Psychology and Psychiatry and Allied Disciplines, 40(5), 743-755. doi: 
10.1111/1469-7610.00490 
Mottron, L., Bouvet, L., Bonnel, A., Samson, F., Burack, J. A., Dawson, M., & Heaton, P. 
(2013). Veridical mapping in the development of exceptional autistic abilities. 
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 37(2), 209-228. doi: 
10.1016/j.neubiorev.2012.11.016 
Norena, A. J. (2011). An integrative model of tinnitus based on a central gain controlling 
neural sensitivity. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 35(5), 1089-1109. doi: 
10.1016/j.neubiorev.2010.11.003 
O'Hare, L., & Hibbard, P. B. (2016). Visual processing in migraine. Cephalalgia, 36(11), 
1057-1076. doi: 10.1177/0333102415618952 
Palmer, C. J., Lawson, R. P., & Hohwy, J. (2017). Bayesian Approaches to Autism: Towards 
Volatility, Action, and Behavior. Psychological Bulletin, 143(5), 521-542. doi: 
10.1037/bul0000097 
Pellicano, E., & Burr, D. (2012). When the world becomes 'too real': a Bayesian explanation 
of autistic perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(10), 504-510. doi: 
10.1016/j.tics.2012.08.009 
Pellicano, E., Jeffery, L., Burr, D., & Rhodes, G. (2007). Abnormal adaptive face-coding 
mechanisms in children with autism spectrum disorder. Current Biology, 17(17), 
1508-1512. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2007.07.065 
Plaisted, K. C. (2001). Reduced generalization in autism: An alternative to weak central 
coherence. 
Pluess, M. (2015). Individual Differences in Environmental Sensitivity. Child Development 
Perspectives, 9(3), 138-143. doi: 10.1111/cdep.12120 
Poole, D., Gowen, E., Warren, P. A., & Poliakoff, E. (2017). Brief Report: Which Came 
First? Exploring Crossmodal Temporal Order Judgements and Their Relationship 
with Sensory Reactivity in Autism and Neurotypicals. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 47(1), 215-223. doi: 10.1007/s10803-016-2925-z 
Porciatti, V., Bonanni, P., Fiorentini, A., & Guerrini, R. (2000). Lack of cortical contrast gain 
control in human photosensitive epilepsy. Nature Neuroscience, 3(3), 259-263. doi: 
10.1038/72972 
Puts, N. A. J., Edden, R. A. E., Evans, C. J., McGlone, F., & McGonigle, D. J. (2011). 
Regionally Specific Human GABA Concentration Correlates with Tactile 
45 
 
Discrimination Thresholds. Journal of Neuroscience, 31(46), 16556-16560. doi: 
10.1523/jneurosci.4489-11.2011 
Puts, N. A. J., Wodka, E. L., Tommerdahl, M., Mostofsky, S. H., & Edden, R. A. E. (2014). 
Impaired tactile processing in children with autism spectrum disorder. Journal of 
Neurophysiology, 111(9), 1803-1811. doi: 10.1152/jn.00890.2013 
Radhakrishnan, K., St Louis, E. K., Johnson, J. A., McCelland, R. L., Westmoreland, B. F., 
& Klass, D. W. (2005). Pattern-sensitive epilepsy: electroclinical characteristics, 
natural history and delination of the epileptic syndrome. Epilepsia, 46, 46–58.  
Ramachandran, V. S., & Marcus, Z. (2017). Synesthesia and the McCollough Effect. 
IPerception, 8(3), 2041669517711718.  
Rao, R. P. N., & Ballard, D. H. (1999). Predictive coding in the visual cortex: a functional 
interpretation of some extra-classical receptive-field effects. Nature Neuroscience, 
2(1), 79-87. doi: 10.1038/4580 
Raznahan, A., Toro, R., Daly, E., Robertson, D., Murphy, C., Deeley, Q., . . . Murphy, D. G. 
M. (2010). Cortical Anatomy in Autism Spectrum Disorder: An In Vivo MRI Study 
on the Effect of Age. Cerebral Cortex, 20(6), 1332-1340. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhp198 
Rinaldi, T., Silberberg, G., & Markram, H. (2008). Hyperconnectivity of local neocortical 
microcircuitry induced by prenatal exposure to valproic acid. Cerebral Cortex, 18(4), 
763-770. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhm117 
Robertson, A. E., & Simmons, D. R. (2013). The Relationship between Sensory Sensitivity 
and Autistic Traits in the General Population. Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders, 43(4), 775-784. doi: 10.1007/s10803-012-1608-7 
Robertson, C. E., Kravitz, D. J., Freyberg, J., Baron-Cohen, S., & Baker, C. I. (2013). Slower 
Rate of Binocular Rivalry in Autism. Journal of Neuroscience, 33(43), 16983-16991. 
doi: 10.1523/jneurosci.0448-13.2013 
Robertson, C. E., Ratai, E. M., & Kanwisher, N. (2016). Reduced GABAergic Action in the 
Autistic Brain. Current Biology, 26(1), 80-85. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2015.11.019 
Rouw, R., Scholte, H. S., & Colizoli, O. (2011). Brain areas involved in synaesthesia: A 
review. Journal of Neuropsychology, 5, 214–242.  
Rubenstein, J. L. R., & Merzenich, M. M. (2003). Model of autism: increased ratio of 
excitation/inhibition in key neural systems. Genes Brain and Behavior, 2(5), 255-267. 
doi: 10.1046/j.1601-183X.2003.00037.x 
Sapey-Triomphe, L. A., Moulin, A., Sonie, S., & Schmitz, C. (2018). The Glasgow Sensory 
Questionnaire: Validation of a French Language Version and Refinement of Sensory 
Profiles of People with High Autism-Spectrum Quotient. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 48(5), 1549-1565. doi: 10.1007/s10803-017-3422-8 
Schirmer, T., & Auer, D. P. (2000). On the reliability of quantitative clinical magnetic 
resonance spectroscopy of the human brain. Nmr in Biomedicine, 13(1), 28-36. doi: 
10.1002/(sici)1099-1492(200002)13:1<28::aid-nbm606>3.0.co;2-l 
Schwartz, O., & Simoncelli, E. P. (2001). Natural signal statistics and sensory gain control. 
Nature Neuroscience, 4(8), 819-825. doi: 10.1038/90526 
Schwarzkopf, D. S., Anderson, E. J., de Haas, B., White, S. J., & Rees, G. (2014). Larger 
Extrastriate Population Receptive Fields in Autism Spectrum Disorders. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 34(7), 2713-2724. doi: 10.1523/jneurosci.4416-13.2014 
Schwedt, T. J. (2013). Multisensory integration in migraine. Current Opinion in Neurology, 
26(3), 248-253. doi: 10.1097/WCO.0b013e328360edb1 
Shannon, C. E. (1948). A Mathematical Theory of Communication. Bell System Technical 
Journal, 27, 379–423.  
46 
 
Sharpee, T. O., Sugihara, H., Kurgansky, A. V., Rebrik, S. P., Stryker, M. P., & Miller, K. D. 
(2006). Adaptive filtering enhances information transmission in visual cortex. Nature, 
439(7079), 936-942. doi: 10.1038/nature04519 
Simmons, D. R., Robertson, A. E., McKay, L. S., Toal, E., McAleer, P., & Pollick, F. E. 
(2009). Vision in autism spectrum disorders. Vision Research, 49(22), 2705-2739. 
doi: 10.1016/j.visres.2009.08.005 
Sinke, C., Neufeld, J., Zedler, M., Emrich, H. M., Bleich, S., Muente, T. F., & Szycik, G. R. 
(2014). Reduced audiovisual integration in synesthesia evidence from bimodal speech 
perception. Journal of Neuropsychology, 8(1), 94-106. doi: 10.1111/jnp.12006 
Stagg, C. J., Bestmann, S., Constantinescu, A. O., Moreno, L. M., Allman, C., Mekle, R., . . . 
Rothwell, J. C. (2011). Relationship between physiological measures of excitability 
and levels of glutamate and GABA in the human motor cortex. Journal of Physiology-
London, 589(23), 5845-5855. doi: 10.1113/jphysiol.2011.216978 
Stevenson, R. A., Siemann, J. K., Schneider, B. C., Eberly, H. E., Woynaroski, T. G., 
Camarata, S. M., & Wallace, M. T. (2014). Multisensory Temporal Integration in 
Autism Spectrum Disorders. Journal of Neuroscience, 34(3), 691-697. doi: 
10.1523/jneurosci.3615-13.2014 
Summerfield, C., Trittschuh, E. H., Monti, J. M., Mesulam, M. M., & Egner, T. (2008). 
Neural repetition suppression reflects fulfilled perceptual expectations. Nature 
Neuroscience, 11(9), 1004-1006. doi: 10.1038/nn.2163 
Takarae, Y., & Sweeney, J. (2017). Neural Hyperexcitability in Autism Spectrum Disorders. 
Brain Sciences, 7(10). doi: 10.3390/brainsci7100129 
Takayama, Y., Hashimoto, R., Tani, M., Kanai, C., Yamada, T., Watanabe, H., . . . Iwanami, 
A. (2014). Standardization of the Japanese version of the Glasgow Sensory 
Questionnaire (GSQ). Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders, 8(4), 347-353. doi: 
10.1016/j.rasd.2013.12.017 
Tavassoli, T., Auyeung, B., Murphy, L. C., Baron-Cohen, S., & Chakrabarti, B. (2012). 
Variation in the autism candidate gene GABRB3 modulates tactile sensitivity in 
typically developing children. Molecular Autism, 3. doi: 10.1186/2040-2392-3-6 
Tavassoli, T., Hoekstra, R. A., & Baron-Cohen, S. (2014). The Sensory Perception Quotient 
(SPQ): development and validation of a new sensory questionnaire for adults with and 
without autism. Molecular Autism, 5. doi: 10.1186/2040-2392-5-29 
Terhune, D. B., Murray, E., Near, J., Stagg, C. J., Cowey, A., & Kadosh, R. C. (2015). 
Phosphene Perception Relates to Visual Cortex Glutamate Levels and Covaries with 
Atypical Visuospatial Awareness. Cerebral Cortex, 25(11), 4341-4350. doi: 
10.1093/cercor/bhv015 
Tolhurst, D. J., Tadmour, Y., & Chao, T. (1992). Amplitude spectra of natural images. 
Ophthalmic and Physiological Optics, 12, 229–232.  
Tuchman, R., & Rapin, I. (2002). Epilepsy in autism. Lancet Neurology, 1(6), 352-358. doi: 
10.1016/s1474-4422(02)00160-6 
Van de Cruys, S., Evers, K., Van der Hallen, R., Van Eylen, L., Boets, B., de-Wit, L., & 
Wagemans, J. (2014). Precise Minds in Uncertain Worlds: Predictive Coding in 
Autism. Psychological Review, 121(4), 649-675. doi: 10.1037/a0037665 
Van de Cruys, S., Van der Hallen, R., & Wagemans, J. (2017). Disentangling signal and 
noise in autism spectrum disorder. Brain and Cognition, 112, 78-83. doi: 
10.1016/j.bandc.2016.08.004 
van der Groen, O., & Wenderoth, N. (2016). Transcranial Random Noise Stimulation of 
Visual Cortex: Stochastic Resonance Enhances Central Mechanisms of Perception. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 36(19), 5289-5298. doi: 10.1523/jneurosci.4519-15.2016 
47 
 
Vilidaite, G., & Baker, D. H. (2017). Individual differences in internal noise are consistent 
across two measurement techniques. Vision Research, 141, 30-39. doi: 
10.1016/j.visres.2016.10.008 
Vlamings, P., Jonkman, L. M., van Daalen, E., van der Gaag, R. J., & Kemner, C. (2010). 
Basic Abnormalities in Visual Processing Affect Face Processing at an Early Age in 
Autism Spectrum Disorder. Biological Psychiatry, 68(12), 1107-1113. doi: 
10.1016/j.biopsych.2010.06.024 
Ward, J., Hoadley, C., Hughes, J. E. A., Smith, P., Allison, C., Baron-Cohen, S., & Simner, J. 
(2017). Atypical sensory sensitivity as a shared feature between synaesthesia and 
autism. Scientific Reports, 7. doi: 10.1038/srep41155 
Watanabe, T., & Rees, G. (2016). Anatomical imbalance between cortical networks in 
autism. Scientific Reports, 6. doi: 10.1038/srep31114 
Williams, D. (1994). Somebody Somewhere: Breaking Free from the World of Autism. 
London: Jessica Kingsley. 
Woolf, C. J. (2011). Central sensitization: Implications for the diagnosis and treatment of 
pain. Pain, 152(3), S2-S15. doi: 10.1016/j.pain.2010.09.030 
Wu, M. S., Lewin, A. B., Murphy, T. K., & Storch, E. A. (2014). Misophonia: Incidence, 
Phenomenology, and Clinical Correlates in an Undergraduate Student Sample. 
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 70(10), 994-1007. doi: 10.1002/jclp.22098 
Zhaoping, L. (2006). Theoretical understanding of the early visual processes by data 
compression and data selection. Network-Computation in Neural Systems, 17(4), 301-
334. doi: 10.1080/09548980600931995 
Zunhammer, M., Schweizer, L. M., Witte, V., Harris, R. E., Bingel, U., & Schmidt-Wilcke, 
T. (2016). Combined glutamate and glutamine levels in pain-processing brain regions 
are associated with individual pain sensitivity. Pain, 157(10), 2248-2256. doi: 
10.1097/j.pain.0000000000000634 
 
 
